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THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
AND
FLEXIBILITY OF EXCHANGE RATES

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In their recently issued Report on *The Role of Exchange Rates in the Adjustment of International Payments*, the Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund express the opinion that “the par value system, based on stable, but adjustable, par values at realistic levels, remains the most appropriate general regime to govern exchange rates in a world of managed national economies” (p. 67). However, the door is left open for changes, even if they should require an amendment of the Articles of Agreement, and there seems to be a consensus among the Executive Directors that the par-value system should be interpreted broadly so that somewhat greater flexibility of exchange rates could be achieved.

Critics of the par-value system prefer to call it the adjustable-peg system. They stress that (1) even a temporary fixity of par values leads to wrong rather than realistic exchange rates, because sufficiently close coordination of domestic policies cannot be achieved in a world of managed national economies; (2) wrong rates give faulty price signals to international trade and capital flows; (3) fixed parities can be sustained only by inordinately large amounts of international liquidity (often created *ad hoc*) or else by restrictions on international trade and payments; and (4) substantial parity adjustments tend to have serious political implications, nationally and internationally.

The basic disagreement concerning the system of par values or adjustable pegs goes back to the two plans which served as a basis for the discussions from which the Bretton Woods Agreement emerged as a compromise between the defenders of a system with fixed par values and the advocates of a system with more flexible exchange rates.

The Bretton Woods Compromise

Most of the experts who participated in the discussions which led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund supported the aim of stability of exchange rates. Harry Dexter White wanted to create an International Stabilization Fund whose resources “would be available under adequate safeguards to maintain currency stability, while giving member countries time to correct maladjustments in their balance of pay-
ments without resorting to extreme measures destructive of international prosperity.” [White Plan, 1943, Preamble 3.] The chaos that existed in international monetary relations through much of the interwar period makes it understandable why currency stability and, in particular, avoidance of competitive exchange depreciation were considered of the utmost importance. Even J. M. Keynes in his Proposals for an International Clearing Union admitted the need for “an orderly and agreed method of determining the relative exchange values of national currency units, so that unilateral action and competitive exchange depreciations are prevented.” [Keynes Plan, 1943, I, i (b).]

But while Keynes did not want to permit alterations of par values without the permission of the Clearing Union, he emphasized the importance of domestic employment policies much more than that of the stability of exchange rates and argued that “instead of maintaining the principle that the internal value of a national currency should conform to a prescribed de jure external value” we should provide “that its external value should be altered if necessary so as to conform to whatever de facto internal value results from domestic policies.” [House of Lords, May 23, 1944.] Keynes suggested, therefore, that the Clearing Union might not only permit but even require “a stated reduction in the value of the member’s currency, if it deems that to be the suitable remedy.” [Keynes Plan, II, 6 (8).] These adjustments depended on the member’s deficit balance with the Union. A member whose credit balance exceeded half of its quota would discuss with the Governing Board “the appreciation of its local currency in terms of bancor or, alternatively, the encouragement of an increase in money rates of earnings.” [II, 6 (8) and (9).]

The White Plan permitted changes in the exchange value of the currency of a member country “only when essential to the correction of fundamental disequilibrium in its balance of payments” and only with the approval of three-fourths of the member votes. [IV, 5.] In the Joint Statement on the Establishment of an International Monetary Fund of April 21, 1944, the compromise between the British and American positions, White’s International Stabilization Fund became an International Monetary Fund and the notion of a “situation of fundamental disequilibrium” was no longer limited to the state of the balance of payments. But the Joint Statement did not set up an adjustment mechanism geared to transactions between the members and the Fund. Keynes’ acceptance of the compromise shows that he believed that the Joint Statement guaranteed the basic principle of managed flexibility of exchange rates. In fact, in the House of Lords he called it “the duty of the Fund to alter the gold value of any currency if it is shown that
this will be serviceable to equilibrium.” Quite possibly White did not agree with Keynes. The vagueness of the concept “fundamental disequilibrium” blurred their differences enough to permit the great compromise.

A small number of economists and politicians expressed at the time the opinion that the Bretton Woods compromise would not work. Most outspoken was a participant in the British Parliamentary Debate, Mr. Benson, who argued on May 12, 1944 in the House of Commons that “even the Keynes Plan would introduce fixed exchange rates which could only be altered by permission, while the three prerequisites to the possibility of fixed exchange rates could not be met simultaneously, viz., (1) an unvarying ratio between international price levels, (2) an equation of imports and exports on current account, and (3) capital movements which represent and equate material movements.” Benson believed that a system of frequent adjustments would be exposed “to disturbing speculative movements since nobody will buy the goods of a country for which a depreciation is impending until the depreciation has taken place.” Frank D. Graham in his Fundamentals of International Monetary Policy [Princeton, 1954, p. 10] expressed the opinion that the new plans “would set up a (wobbly) system of fixed rates (maintained until collapse is imminent) without any provision for the adoption of the internationally unified price level policy under which, alone, fixed exchange rates can make sense.” And R. G. Hawtrey commented in Bretton Woods for Better or Worse [London, 1946, p. 4] that “the limitation by the Bretton Woods Plan of the freedom of a member to release its currency from fixed rates of exchange is a serious danger.”

The Bretton Woods system meant to combine the disciplining effect of fixed parities with the safety valve of parity changes if external equilibrium at fixed rates required either too much inflation or too much unemployment in the member countries. It did not contain an adjustment “mechanism” or even reasonably clear indicators as to when parity adjustments were in order.

When the Executive Directors say in their recent study “that the basic principles of the Bretton Woods system are sound and should be maintained and strengthened” (p. 67) they refer to principles not at all clear from the beginning and to a system whose main defect has been, all along, that it lacked an exchange-rate mechanism. That they did not fully trust the system of fixed rates is shown by their quoting the following passage from the Fund’s 1969 Annual Report:

If exchange rates that are no longer appropriate are nevertheless maintained, they contribute to the persistence of payments disequilibria, the encourage-
ment of speculation, and crises in the exchange markets. Moreover, undue rigidity of exchange rates may lead to the very developments that the par value system is intended to avoid, including restrictions on current transactions, the imposition or intensification of capital controls, and the sluggish growth of development aid.

This quotation implies an admission that an "undue rigidity" of exchange rates can develop under the par-value system, and this realization evidently induced the Directors to consider a somewhat broader interpretation not only of the definition of fundamental disequilibrium but also of the whole operation of the system.

The Par-Value System

The Executive Directors' Report sees the essence of the par-value system in the acceptance by the member countries of a limitation on their freedom of action over the exchange rate and in the acceptance by the international community of the right of individual countries "to adjust their exchange rates to fulfill legitimate domestic objectives, as well as agreed international objectives" (p. 5).

The aim of the par-value system as described in Article I(iii) of the Fund Agreement is "to promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation." However, the newer proposals for greater flexibility of exchange rates also want to promote stability. If the expression "orderly exchange arrangements" refers to the absence of exchange controls, it is equally applicable to wider margins and gliding parities. Finally, the new proposals, too, want to avoid competitive exchange depreciation. Success in this direction in the post-World War II period cannot be credited exclusively to the maintenance of par values. As the Report admits, member countries are less likely to embark on competitive exchange depreciation because of the growing success of their employment policies. But the Report seems to claim a substantial part of this success for the elasticity of a system that permits adjustment of parities where permanently fixed exchange rates would prevent external equilibrium at high levels of employment. What the Report does not emphasize is the fact that, today, the main danger does not come from competitive exchange depreciation but from the maintenance of disaligned parities under a par-value system whose members have been all too slow in their adjustment to realistic par values.

"Undue delay" in the adjustment of par values may have occurred because fears of competitive exchange depreciation were stronger than objections to continued undervaluation. The concept "fundamental disequilibrium" was meant to be a protective fence against both "pre-
mature” and “unduly delayed” parity changes and it seems that in the operation of the system the general trend was to err in the direction of too much delay. With the Report’s new interpretation of fundamental disequilibrium, this situation may improve.

Concerning the domestic aspects of the par-value system, the Report states that the exchange rate as the price of foreign exchange in terms of domestic money “performs certain basic functions of the price mechanism in influencing the allocation of resources and contributing to the balancing of supply and demand of the commodity in question—in this case foreign exchange” (p. 6). This statement would be correct if it referred to freely floating exchange rates; applied to fixed parities it is wrong, because artificially fixed prices do not perform their basic function in accordance with the principles of market economies. Indeed, they interfere with the market mechanism, maintain obsolete prices, and prevent the balancing of demand and supply via market forces, so that equilibrium must be achieved either through official sales and purchases in the foreign-exchange market or through direct controls.

The Report argues that the exchange rate in the par-value system should be looked upon “as a fixed point of reference which provides a useful discipline for the maintenance of financial stability domestically...” and states that fixed par values have “an important influence on basic financial magnitudes in a national economy,” that is, “the flow of aggregate domestic output, incomes, and spending” (p. 6). Thus, while giving lip service to the exchange rate as a price and to its balancing effect on demand and supply, the Report concludes that this strategic price ought to be fixed so as to force responsible national monetary policies upon the member countries of the system and so as to create external balance indirectly through changes in domestic aggregates rather than in exchange rates. However, this disciplinary effect of the par-value system would be desirable only if the exchange rates could be maintained at “realistic” levels and this would be possible only if the national economic policies of the member countries could be adequately coordinated through pressures exerted by fixed par values.

The Report reminds us that “in many countries the authorities have regarded a stable par value as a valuable aid in maintaining domestic economic stability” (p. 32). We are told that even in countries “which have not succeeded in dispensing with eventual exchange adjustment, the norm of fixity in the exchange rate has nonetheless been considered as an aid to equilibrium, both in the domestic economy and externally,” because it promoted “political willingness to impose unpopular domestic restraints” (p. 32). This argument is not convincing: external equilibrium obviously was not reached, since eventually the parity had to be ad-
justed; and the domestic measures, though not achieving the external objective, may well have harmed the domestic economy, which was forced to accept the punishment of an unrealistic exchange rate for too long. Here the authors of the Report express sympathy with the very attitude which, in the past, has produced many undesirable delays in the adjustment of par values. They go even further when they argue that “where the attempt to defend the parity is ultimately unsuccessful, the psychological shock of a devaluation may promote broad support for the adoption of the necessary associated measures to curtail domestic demand” (p. 32). A more continuous adjustment of parities “without the trauma implicit in the act of exchange adjustment as a last resort, would exert less pressure for domestic corrective measures” (p. 32). Here the Report goes to the extreme position of actually defending “unduly delayed” parity changes by relatively large percentages.

The Report admits, however, that “in some countries that have been more successful than others in curbing inflation, maintenance of a fixed exchange rate has increased the difficulty of preserving domestic financial stability” (p. 32). Quite generally the Report agrees “that adjustments in par values have in a number of cases been unduly delayed,” that “these delays have sometimes tended to aggravate problems of domestic economic management, and have sometimes also aggravated the external disequilibrium” (p. 34). The Report concedes, furthermore, that these delays have fostered the use of trade and payments restrictions and led to the building up of large speculative positions which played a dis-equilibrating role. Nevertheless, the Report suggests that these disadvantages may be weaknesses of the operation of the system rather than of the system itself and could be considered “as necessary costs that in the long run are outweighed by compensating advantages” (p. 34).

Achievements of the Par-Value System

The Report credits the par-value system with having contributed to the achievement “of unparalleled economic growth; albeit accompanied by continuing domestic inflation” (p. 29). But since this achievement was, admittedly, “the result of a complex of factors” (p. 29) it is not easy to identify the specific contribution of exchange-rate arrangements and policies. Concerning the par-value system, it remains an open question whether its main contribution came from the stabilizing effect of the “fixed point of reference” rather than from the freedom which the adjustability of the peg permitted in the national economic policies of the member countries. Historical references are not very helpful, particularly if we recall that the system was not free from international payments crises and restrictions on trade and capital movements.
The Report stresses the virtual absence of competitive exchange depreciation, evidently implying that this beggar-my-neighbor policy could not have been avoided with greater flexibility of exchange rates.

Another claim for the par-value system contends that “the arrangements under which countries other than the United States regulate their currency against the U.S. dollar . . . while the United States itself pursues a generally passive role in exchange markets, have provided a way of avoiding conflict between the actions of exchange authorities of different countries, without necessitating the elaboration of a set of rules or understandings on policies of exchange support” (p. 31). We have to ask, however, how this system has affected the competitive position of the key-currency country itself and we may have to agree with C. Fred Bergsten that the United States has suffered under a system in which (1) “payments pressures prompt or force devaluations, but seldom prompt or force revaluations,” (2) revaluations tend to be smaller and devaluations larger than necessary, and (3) “any single devaluation generates pressures on other countries to devalue, both because of legitimate fears over loss of competitive position . . . and because devaluation is easier to justify politically if done in response to a like movement by another country.” Bergsten concludes that “these biases toward devaluation against the dollar” explain American balance-of-payments deficits to a significant degree and, thus, that a system with greater exchange-rate flexibility “would be in the interest of the United States.” [See Approaches to Greater Flexibility of Exchange Rates, The Bürgenstock Papers, ed., George N. Halm, Princeton 1970, pp. 68 and 75.] The Report does not mention the fact that serious conflicts have arisen between the United States and certain surplus countries under the par-value system.

Apart from fostering discipline and avoiding competitive exchange depreciation, the main advantage claimed for the par-value system is that it will not be subject to “premature” changes of exchange rates. Why it should be obvious that exchange rates must be fixed at all times, why “it would be clearly inappropriate to adjust parities in response to balance of payments disequilibria of a seasonal or short-term cyclical nature” (p. 48) is not explained in the Report. Whenever an explanation is attempted, it leads quickly into the discipline argument or the rejection of competitive exchange depreciation. The authors of the Report seem to assume that floating exchange rates would always fluctuate substantially and that these fluctuations would present an unbearable additional risk to all international transactions. This reasoning need not be discussed again, but a reminder may be in order that those who are afraid of what even relatively small fluctuations of exchange rates might do
to the allocation of domestic resources are not consistent when they reject proposals for greater flexibility of exchange rates with the argument that the equilibrating effect of relatively small movements of exchange rates within a broadened band would tend to be negligible.

Whatever the arguments for fixity of the exchange rates and against premature adjustments of parities, it is imperative that the par-value system should be provided with reasonably clear criteria by which the difference between “premature” and “unduly delayed” adjustments can be determined. Since adjustments are to be permitted in cases of “fundamental disequilibrium,” the Report makes the attempt to explain this concept which the experts at Bretton Woods had left vague on purpose.

**Fundamental Disequilibrium**

The Report emphasizes that a state of fundamental disequilibrium can exist when a country enjoys external balance, so long as “attainment of payments balance through the use of measures destructive of national or international prosperity would clearly not comprise a durable payments equilibrium” (p. 48). For instance, the external balance is only maintained by restrictions on trade or payments or by “an unacceptably low rate of economic activity” (p. 48). Similarly, the external balance may only have been maintained at the price of “an unacceptably high rate of inflation” (p. 48) or artificial measures encouraging the export of capital. So far, so good. However, the Report makes the concept of fundamental disequilibrium a prop of the par-value system by insisting that it implies “that where other measures can be taken to restore payments balance without damage to national or international prosperity, these should be preferred to exchange adjustment” (p. 49).

A different situation exists, states the Report, “where the requirements of internal and external stabilization point in opposite directions for domestic policy (e.g., where an external surplus coincides with excessive strain on domestic resources). There is then no such presumption in favor of domestic measures directed to restoring external equilibrium, since such measures, at least if unaccompanied by exchange adjustment, will intensify the domestic disequilibrium” (p. 49). Fundamental disequilibrium, therefore, exists when internal and external considerations are “pulling in opposite directions as regards domestic stabilization measures” (p. 49) and if this conflict is of a persistent nature.

Persistent surpluses are more likely than persistent deficits, because surplus countries are in a position to avoid parity adjustments whereas deficit countries are often forced to devalue. The reason is that a country can always buy up an excess supply of foreign exchange with its own newly created money while a deficit country must, sooner or later,
exhaust its own or borrowed liquidity reserves. This asymmetrical situation, which the Report does not stress, suggests that special pressure ought to be exerted in the case of a surplus country which is unwilling to revalue because it wants to preserve its export advantage. Some interesting suggestions concerning an asymmetrical treatment of surplus and deficit countries have been made by George H. Chittenden, William Fellner, and Robert V. Roosa in The Bünigenstock Papers, but they have not been mentioned in the Report.

Mere reference to dilemma cases is not going to solve the practical problem of steering the right course between "premature" and "unduly delayed" par-value changes. To begin with, we cannot automatically support fixed par values merely because measures for external and internal equilibrium do not conflict. It is true that when a country that is suffering from underemployment finds itself in payments surplus it can employ expansionist policies without immediate need to worry about its balance of payments. However, in a system with freely flexible exchange rates the market rates would not begin to depreciate until a successful policy of domestic expansion reverses the demand and supply situation on the foreign-exchange market. Rejection of greater flexibility of exchange rates when applied to this case rests on the suspicion that competitive exchange depreciation would be used to achieve full employment—an unjustified assumption when we consider that much better employment policies are available today and remember that the spirit of international monetary cooperation is not exclusively the product of the par-value feature of the Bretton Woods system.

For countries that suffer from balance-of-payments deficits while they maintain full employment—another nondilemma case—the Report suggests once more the maintenance of fixed par values and the use of high rates of interest, since the latter would combat domestic inflation and attract foreign funds, thereby eliminating external imbalance. It is not a foregone conclusion, however, that maintenance of the par value is the best policy in this case. The monetary constraints required for removal of the deficit may cause an unacceptable degree of unemployment under modern conditions of cost-push and administrative price inflation. We can assume, therefore, that the Executive Directors would consider this situation a clear case of fundamental disequilibrium.

In dilemma cases, internal and external considerations pull in opposite directions and the Report suggests that this conflict "may indicate a fundamental disequilibrium" (p. 49). A surplus country with full employment, for instance, that insists on maintaining an undervalued currency, will increase its external surplus when it tries to combat inflationary pressures by conservative monetary and fiscal policies. It should
be noted that this is the case of what Gottfried Haberler calls "competitive fixity" of the par value which, under present conditions, is far more important than the case of competitive exchange depreciation which the Report considers a danger that could still occur.

When a deficit country suffers from unemployment, any attempt to achieve more satisfactory levels of economic activity would be accompanied by an increasing external deficit if the parity is not adjusted. The Report seems to envision parity changes in such cases, though it does point to "an attendant risk of inducing premature or unnecessary exchange adjustments, and perhaps also of weakening the pressure for desirable domestic correctives" (p. 50). Even where a dilemma between external and internal requirements exists, the evidence of fundamental disequilibrium must be "substantial" though not "overwhelming."

If it were possible to establish a state of fundamental disequilibrium easily and clearly, the members of the Fund might still not always be willing or able to change the par value of their currencies: either because they want to maintain the advantages of competitive undervaluation; or because as key-currency countries they practically cannot devalue; or, finally, because devaluation is impossible for the very reason of the traumatic shock effects on which the Report comments not altogether disapprovingly.

The Question of Discipline

At the very core of the par-value system lies the conviction that proper international monetary arrangements need par values as fixed points of reference for national-policy guidance. However, the par value may not be as good a disciplinarian as the authors of the Report believe.

First of all, the par-value system cannot claim the advantages of a system with unalterably fixed par values. Once parity changes are permitted in cases of fundamental disequilibrium, the members of the system are no longer barred from using policies which lead to fundamental disequilibrium and need no longer defend their international liquidity reserves through inconvenient management of domestic demand. Harmonization of national economic policies can then no longer be counted on.

That the par-value system could function at all was due to the emergence of the United States as a key-currency country and the series of ingenious devices for creation of international liquidity inside and outside the Fund that has recently culminated in the creation of the Special Drawing Rights. However, the very availability of additional international liquidity in emergency situations was actually a strong factor which
militated against the discipline that was supposed to be the mainstay of
the par-value system.

Advocates of the par-value system tend to neglect the fact that changes
in the international liquidity reserves of a country can be used to prevent
competitive exchange depreciation in a system with floating exchange
rates, for instance, by way of a “fixed reserve standard,” as suggested
by Donald B. Marsh [The Bürgenstock Papers, ch. 29], in which official
reserves are allowed to vary only within a permissible “band.”

If a wrong (misaligned, unrealistic) par value is used as the point of
reference, it leads automatically to distortions. A price system with wrong
prices might conceivably be even worse than a system that stops relying
on prices altogether. This is the reason why price-fixing leads so often to
quantitative restrictions. In the par-value system, unrealistic parities can
lead to external deficits which finally push the stricken country into the
increasing use of direct controls. This is the ultimate breakdown of a
market system that relies on fixed parities to maintain discipline. (Ulti-
mate—but usually not very long in arriving.)

The par-value system is supposed to have a stabilizing and anti-in-
flationary effect, while a system with flexible exchange rates is considered
to be soft on inflation. Exactly the opposite may be true. Haberler has
shown that “under a floating rate, when the balance of payments is kept
continuously in equilibrium, a country has to swallow the inflation or de-
flation it generates and cannot get relief by unloading part of the burden
on others.” [The Bürgenstock Papers, p. 120.] The Report concedes
this point when it admits that the pressure to correct an inflation may for
a time be smaller under the par-value system “than if the real cost of
the inflation were exposed and transmitted to the domestic public at
large through a depreciated exchange rate” (p. 35). However, it does
not draw practical conclusions from this admission. On the contrary, it
argues that “the external constraint on inflation provided by the need
to defend a given parity would weaken, and this might weaken the
political and psychological resistances to inflation . . . .” (p. 37).

Advocates of greater flexibility have pointed out that a fluctuating
exchange rate may be a better disciplinarian than a fixed par value.
While the latter induces policies aimed at the defense of international
liquidity reserves, variations of exchange rates will exert an even more
direct pressure on monetary authorities “because prompt exchange-rate
movements are loud warning signals to the public . . . while reserve
movements are not.” [Fellner in The Bürgenstock Papers, p. 241.]

These arguments—that the par-value system has no title to the ad-
vantages that may be claimed for a system with an unalterable rate, that
discipline may be weakened by excessive liquidity creation, that move-
ments in reserves and in exchange rates can be used as sensitive indica-
tors, and that inflation may be more strictly checked when its effects are
confined to domestic prices through flexible exchange rates—these argu-
ments make the Report’s reliance on the supposed discipline of the par-
value system a rather feeble excuse for its rejection of a major break-
through in the direction of greater flexibility of exchange rates.

Rejected Proposals

The Report rejects three proposals as inconsistent with the par-value
system: a system with freely fluctuating exchange rates, a substantial
widening of the band for permissible exchange-rate fluctuations, and the
various suggestions for effecting parity changes frequently and accord-
ing to objective indicators (as with some variations of the crawling peg).

The Report argues that a system with freely fluctuating exchange
rates has the essential drawback “that national authorities could not be
expected in modern conditions to adopt a policy of neutrality with
respect to movements in an economic variable of such importance to the
domestic economy as the exchange rate, with its effects on prices, in-
comes, employment, and the structure of industry as between domestic
and foreign sectors” (p. 42). The Report takes it for granted, further-
more, that speculative capital movements would be exaggerated and
disequilibrating in a system with freely floating exchange rates. The
argument that movements of exchange rates would be possible in either
direction and that this would be more likely to produce equilibrating
capital movements than a par-value system with unrealistic rates is
ignored, together with all the other arguments that have been brought
forward in favor of a system in which the exchange rate would be per-
mitted to perform the function of a genuine market price. Once more
we notice that the Report considers domestic policies unreliable as soon
as they operate outside the safeguards of the par-value system.

A substantial widening of the band for permissible exchange rates
does not fare much better than a system with freely floating exchange
rates and the criticism is essentially the same: “countries would find their
competitive positions subjected to sudden and inappropriate changes as
a result of temporary market developments or of administrative actions
of other countries through official interventions in exchange markets”
(p. 43). Since the rules of the par-value system with its narrow band
would no longer apply, “a new set of rules relating to official interven-
tion in exchange markets” (p. 44) would have to be developed. Once
more the Report assumes “disturbing fluctuations” or artificial interfer-
ence in the market without ever crediting movements of exchange rates with equilibrating or adjustment effects.

Finally, the Report rejects the various proposals to effect parity changes automatically and frequently on the basis of objective indicators so as to make these movements more continuous, less disruptive, less exposed to disequilibrating speculation, less sensitive to political considerations, and less likely to lead to restrictions. Against these potential benefits the Report enumerates the following "overriding disadvantages": movements of exchange rates where adjustments are unnecessary and even movements "in an inappropriate direction" (p. 45); the removal of political and psychological constraints that would have "strengthened the hands of the domestic authorities in securing acceptance of necessary domestic adjustments that would otherwise be resisted" (p. 45); and, finally, the danger that "national authorities might choose to avoid what they regarded as an inappropriate movement in their exchange rate" (p. 45).

Only a very firm believer in the par-value system can be satisfied with these criticisms. We can grant that it will certainly not be easy to find the proper objective criteria for small and frequent adjustments of the parity because it is implicit in any gliding-parity scheme that it lacks the "substantial" or even "overwhelming" signs of the existence of a fundamental disequilibrium which characterize the present system and make it so objectionable. We must consider that the adjustments under a crawling-peg system would be kept so small that even an occasional misreading of the indicators could not do much harm. It would need a continued and even a willful misreading of the indicators before such a system would be exposed to tensions of the order of magnitude characteristic of the present system when unrealistic par values are used as points of reference and presage a coming devaluation or revaluation.

Suggested Improvements

The Report points to the following main areas in which improvements of the par-value system may be sought: the minimization of undue delays in parity adjustments and minimization of the risk of premature adjustments; the smoothness of adjustments so that they can be brought about "with smaller attendant movements of speculative funds in a disequilibrating direction" (p. 40); and, though obviously considered to be of only secondary importance, the problem of "an appropriate relationship between downward and upward adjustments in parities" (p. 40).

The Report suggests three improvements of the present system: (1) prompt adjustment of parities in appropriate cases, (2) a slight
widening of the margin around parity, and (3) temporary deviations from par-value obligations.

While the Report recommends "prompt adjustments of parities in appropriate cases" (p. 71), it expresses great reluctance in bestowing the designation "appropriate." The crucial concept "fundamental disequilibrium" has been chosen in such a way that it becomes an integral part of the par-value system through the exclusion of all disequilibria that can, without excessive harm or trouble, be overcome by measures other than exchange-rate adjustments. And small parity adjustments are frowned upon on principle because they are obviously not able to deal with fundamental disequilibria. Existence of a payments imbalance does not constitute fundamental disequilibrium "where the imbalance can be corrected by acceptable international measures outside the exchange rate field" (p. 72). It is not clear what these measures are supposed to be. The furnishing of additional international liquidity would have no adjustment effect and would only lead to further delays; nor can exchange restrictions be meant, because the Report states that a particularly important consideration in connection with parity adjustments would be "to minimize recourse to restrictions on trade and current payments" (p. 40). We are told that "imposition of restrictions on trade and payments even for temporary periods may often cause more disturbance to the smooth flow of international trade than would follow from moderate adjustments in exchange rates" (p. 36). In this revealing passage, corrections of wrong exchange rates are supposed to have disturbing effects on the flow of trade, obviously only somewhat less disturbing than the exclusion of market forces by means of direct controls!

Surprisingly, the Executive Directors are inclined to "consider" the suggestion that "the Articles of Agreement might be amended to allow members to make changes in their parities without the concurrence of the Fund as long as such changes did not exceed, say, 3 per cent in any twelve-month period nor a cumulative amount of, say, 10 per cent in any five-year period" (p. 73). The Report adds that "under this proposal, the Fund could be empowered to question improper use of this special facility" (p. 73). It is remarkable that the Executive Directors, after having summarily rejected the whole family of gliding-peg proposals, refer here without criticism to a very similar proposal but without trying to solve the problem of the proper determination of the size and direction of frequent but relatively small parity adjustments. It seems that the Executive Directors do not reject more frequent adjustments of parities as such but are dead set against routine changes by formula.

The Executive Directors also remind us that "the Fund normally
considers the appropriateness of the exchange rate of the currency of any member that envisages making a transaction in the higher credit tranches" (p. 73). With this passage the Directors return vaguely and briefly to an idea which formed the core of the adjustment mechanism of the Keynes Plan.

Several of the new proposals want to connect parity adjustments with changes in international liquidity reserves. The difference between these suggestions and the above-mentioned practice of the Fund is twofold: parity changes are to be prompted by both losses and gains in liquidity reserves that are considered excessive, and the liquidity reserves would not be determined only by the relative abundance or scarcity of the members' currencies in the Fund.

The Report favors slightly wider margins because they can encourage equilibrating capital movements (when parity changes are not expected) and thereby help provide "a larger freedom of maneuver for domestic monetary policy" (p. 56). Capital usually flows in anticipation of a subsequent recoil of the exchange rate once a temporary disequilibrium has been overcome. This argument is very old. It was already used within the framework of the old gold mechanism to explain the use of policies by which the gold points could be pried apart. More interesting is the statement that "increasing the size of the band in relation to that of the typical parity change should . . . be expected to reduce somewhat the extent to which prospective parity changes attract destabilizing speculation . . . and contribute to a slightly smoother process of exchange adjustment" (p. 59). But, since this influence of a slightly wider band "would be most important in a regime of parity adjustments by predominantly smaller amounts" (p. 59), the argument does not seem to fit well into a Report which rejects the gliding-parity schemes.

In a system with only slightly widened margins, exchange-rate fluctuations are expected "to have only a minor effect on countries' competitive positions" (p. 74). The trade balance would not be materially changed. Thus one of the major advantages of wider market fluctuations of exchange rates would be lost—a price which the Executive Directors are willing to pay for protection against competitive exchange depreciation and for domestic monetary discipline fostered by the par-value system. The Report points out that it would be difficult "to determine how far one could go beyond the present margins before the potential disadvantages of a widening of margins would outbalance any potential benefits from such widening . . ." (p. 74).

A footnote to the quoted passage reveals that "the size of the margin mentioned in the course of the Executive Directors' discussions was 2 per cent, or at most 3 per cent, against an intervention currency"
But the Report points out that the choice of the band “could depend inter alia on whether Fund approval would be required before an individual member could apply wider margins” (p. 74). The suggestion that the widening of the band could be gradual and experimental, and possibly asymmetrical, is not discussed.

The Report admits “that occasions have arisen in the past in which exceptional pressures induced individual countries to suspend the observance of their par value obligations and to move to a fluctuating rate” (p. 76). The Fund has taken notice of such action but was not authorized to approve it. The Executive Directors emphasize that if the Fund had the power of approval it would have to insist on the institution of “adequate safeguards” to take the place of the protective devices implied in the par-value system. The Report does not explain in detail the nature of these safeguards, but it mentions consultations between the member and the Fund, remarks on the only temporary nature of any departure from the par-value system, and demands assurances against the imposition or intensification of restrictions (p. 78). Such assurances may not be needed for the specific situation, since the decision to allow market forces to operate must have been caused by the desire to get rid of some of the restrictions that the par-value system had produced.

**Concluding Remarks**

For advocates of a substantial increase in the flexibility of exchange rates, the Report is, on the whole, a disappointing document. It suggests no real breakthrough in the direction of a genuine adjustment mechanism based on greater flexibility of exchange rates. The occasional references to the price or exchange-rate mechanism cannot hide the fact that such a mechanism is still lacking. Adjustments of par values to rectify fundamental disequilibria do not amount to a mechanism.

Nevertheless, some passages of the Report, when read out of context, suggest that the Executive Directors are willing to contemplate important changes: a slightly wider band (up to 4 or even 6 per cent) and changes in par values, even without concurrence of the Fund, up to 3 per cent in any twelve-month period or up to 10 per cent in any five-year period. They may, on certain occasions, even condone the temporary use of freely floating exchange rates. Also, after having first rejected freely floating exchange rates, substantially wider margins, and automatic parity adjustments, they immediately tone down their disapproval with the disarming admission that “in rejecting these alternative exchange rate regimes” they “do not fail to recognize that any one of these regimes could in some respects and on certain assumptions perform more satisfactorily than the present par value system” (pp. 69-70). However,
the Directors consider it next to impossible that these assumptions can be made, since the benefits “need to be considered in the context of the associated serious drawbacks of these regimes, and of the grave risks that would be entailed in an abandonment of the safeguards of the par value system” (p. 70).

When the Report rejects the alternative regimes because their disadvantages are believed to outweigh their advantages, it implicitly also rejects its own suggestions for greater flexibility of exchange rates, perhaps with the exception of the “slight” widening of the margins. Continuous references to the discipline engendered by fixed parities, the wastes of premature changes of parities, and the always lurking dangers of competitive exchange depreciation make it likely that, when called to the test, the Executive Directors will tend to avoid parity adjustments until their inescapability has become almost overwhelmingly clear.

The Report’s definition of fundamental disequilibrium is not, and cannot be, precise enough to help member countries find the correct moment for, and the correct amount of, changes in par values. Repeated study of the Report leaves the reader with the impression that the Executive Directors consider it safer to err in the direction of delay. If, occasionally, a different interpretation seems to be justified, this hope is always dashed by a postscript that harps on the dangers of any substantial deviation from the par-value system.

The reader is left with the impression that the Report is the work of two teams, one with rather conservative convictions and the other leaning toward greater flexibility of exchange rates. In a consolidation of the diverging findings of these two groups, passages sharply critical of the new proposals as well as passages favoring deviations from the par-value system had to be defused by instantly following disclaimers. Still, on the whole, the Report leans heavily toward a continuation of the present system with only minor changes.

The Executive Directors seem to be of the opinion that the par-value system is excellent in principle but that the Fund’s members have not availed themselves of the opportunities that were built into it. Yet in spite of a brave attempt to help the members through a clarification of the meaning of “fundamental disequilibrium,” the Report does not succeed in formulating practical guidelines for changes in par values, except those that could not be avoided anyway.

The authors of the Report show little understanding for the role of the exchange rate as a price and for the inconsistency implied in fixing this price between currencies of countries whose domestic policies cannot be adequately coordinated. The fixing of exchange rates will lead again and again to distortions and tensions until the par-value system acquires
an adjustment mechanism in which greater flexibility of exchange rates replaces rare and abrupt parity changes.

On the whole, however, while the Report is a defense of the par-value system rather than a study of the new proposals for greater flexibility of exchange rates, it indicates a willingness on the part of the Executive Directors to make some concessions. Fortunately, these concessions come close to the changes which were proposed by the majority of the participants of the Bürgenstock Conference of June 1969, favoring “both widening the range (or ‘band’) within which exchange rates may respond to market forces and permitting a more continuous and gradual adjustment of parities” [Bürgenstock Communiqué in The Bürgenstock Papers, p. vii]. It is to be hoped that a compromise solution can be worked out that requires only minor changes in the Articles of Agreement and will be ready when the next international payments crisis awakens renewed political interest in greater flexibility of exchange rates.
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